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A B S T R A C T
Personal criteria about the morally appropriate forms of behavior can be crucial when coming
into contact with members of culturally diﬀerent outgroups. In our study, we investigated
whether moral exclusion mediates the relationship between moral foundations and positive and
negative behavioral intentions toward Muslim people. Our aim was to identify the psychological
mechanism that explains why particular people intend to harm (or not harm), and help (or not
help) members of particular outgroups. Using survey data from an online questionnaire, struc-
tural equation modeling and mediation analysis showed that individualizing moral foundations
had a negative relationship with negative behavioral intentions and a positive relationship with
positive intentions towards Muslim people. Binding moral foundations showed the opposite
connection with behavioral intentions. The relationship between moral foundations and inter-
group behavioral intentions was mediated by moral exclusion. These results imply that moral
intuitions form the basis of behavioral intentions toward a culturally diﬀerent outgroup both
directly and by inﬂuencing whether or not the outgroup is worthy of moral concern.
Introduction
History books will most likely mention the post-2015 period in Europe as the time after “The Big Migration Crisis”. In 2015 and
2016 about 2.6 million refugees applied for asylum after reaching the territory of EU-member countries. Most refugees came from
Muslim countries escaping from Middle Eastern and North African conﬂict zones (Eurostat, 2017). This meant an enormous challenge
and source of tension in most European countries, not only in those countries that actually accepted refugees, but also in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE). These countries had practically no previous experience with immigration, especially immigration from Muslim
countries, while the general level of xenophobia is higher in these countries than in Western Europe. The appropriate way to respond
to the crisis became a highly controversial issue in CEE countries. The question was framed mainly as a moral dilemma between the
responsibility to defend the country from mass-immigration and the responsibility to help people in need. Considering the moral
nature of this dilemma, the current research aims to reveal how people’s concepts about right and wrong predict speciﬁc forms of
behavior towards a culturally diﬀerent outgroup.
Social psychological research on intergroup relations and behavior has described at least two important factors regarding morality
that inﬂuence behavioral preferences towards outgroups. Firstly, people behave on the basis of their personal moral intuitions toward
another person: what they feel to be morally right or morally wrong towards the members of that particular group in that particular
situation. (e.g. Graham et al., 2013; Janoﬀ-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). Secondly, behavior toward another person can also depend on
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the deﬁnition of one’s moral community, that is, the demarcation of the boundaries within which personal moral values and rules
apply. People outside these boundaries are not regarded as worthy of moral considerations (e.g. Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian,
2016; Opotow, 1990, 2012; Passini & Morselli, 2017).
By linking these two factors, our aim is to supplement existing research about the moral aspects of intergroup behavior. Building
upon moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007, 2009) and research on moral exclusion (e.g. Opotow,
1990, 2012; Passini & Morselli, 2017), we suggest that moral intuitions and the exclusion of a culturally diﬀerent outgroup do not
aﬀect intergroup behavioral intentions independently from each other. Instead, we suggest that certain moral intuitions are related to
the expansiveness of one’s moral community, and either expose or defend culturally diﬀerent outgroups from the risk of moral
exclusion. We suggest that this kind of moral exclusion mediates the eﬀect of one’s moral intuitions on intergroup behavioral
intentions.
Western societies – including Hungary – have treated Muslim immigrants and refugees both by unimaginable hostility (Dearden &
McIntyre, 2017), and by oﬀering help in the form of donations, volunteer helping, and political advocacy (Frayer, 2015). Positive and
negative intergroup behavior are associated with common, but antagonistic psychological mechanism, and associated with diﬀerent
intergroup stereotypes and attitudes (as suggested by e.g. the stereotype content model, Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). However,
engagement in pro-social behavior, such as volunteerism or social change oriented collective action, cannot be explained simply by
the reversed mechanisms of intergroup hostility (for the motivations of collective action engagement see van Zomeren, Postmes, &
Spears, 2008, for an overview of volunteer motivations, see Penner, 2002; Snyder & Omoto, 2008). Therefore, we aim to supplement
previous research by focusing on the psychological mechanisms of both negative and positive intergroup behavior in the context of
moral decisions.
Moral foundations and intergroup relations
In the recent years, several attempts have been made to map and integrate the values and motives of moral judgments and
intuitions (e.g. Graham et al., 2011; Grey, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Janoﬀ-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Rai & Fiske, 2011). One of the most
fruitful branches of this undertaking is undoubtedly the moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2011, 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007,
2009).
According to moral foundations theory, moral intuitions are primarily determined by personal moral foundations. These are
innate, modular foundations of moral reasoning with evolutionary roots but also shaped by the social and cultural environment. The
theory maps ﬁve moral foundations that are related to ﬁve diﬀerent domains of morality: care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and
sanctity. Care and fairness are often mentioned as individualizing foundations, and loyalty, authority, and sanctity constitute the
category of binding foundations (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Nilsson, Erlandsson, & Västfjäll, 2016).
The main evolutionary function of both forms of foundations is to protect the community from individual selﬁshness. However,
they serve this function by essentially diﬀerent mechanisms. Individualizing foundations achieve this by direct disapproval and
prohibition of doing harm to others, and by making people respect the rights of others. In contrast, binding foundations protect
communities by binding people to cohesive groups and institutions, and by creating well-deﬁned roles within these groups and their
institutional systems (for a review see Graham et al., 2013).
It follows from the characteristics of moral foundations that individualizing foundations make people take others’ well-being into
consideration regardless of their group membership, and binding foundations make them consider the interests and intactness of the
ingroup ﬁrst. This has important consequences for intergroup attitudes and behavior. Individualizing moral foundations foster
helping intentions towards outgroups in need, while binding foundations are negatively related to prosocial intentions if the ben-
eﬁciaries are outgroup members (Nilsson et al., 2016; Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014). Individualizing foundations are
negatively, and binding foundations are positively associated with intergroup prejudice (Hadarics & Kende, 2017b; Kugler, Jost, &
Noorbaloochi, 2014; Low & Wui, 2016; Van de Vyver, Houston, Abrams, & Vasiljevic, 2016). Furthermore, people with strong
binding and weak individualizing foundations tend to perceive culturally diﬀerent outgroups as more threatening (Hadarics & Kende,
2017a), they are more willing to display discriminatory behavior towards them (Kugler et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2014), and prefer
more aggressive and less cooperative conﬂict resolution strategies in international conﬂicts (Kertzer, Powers, Rathbun, & Iyer, 2014).
Moral exclusion and intergroup relations
Although it is clear that the two overarching dimensions of moral foundations have a consistent relationship with intergroup
attitudes towards culturally diﬀerent outgroups, the underlying mechanism of this relationship is less clear. For speciﬁc intergroup
behavioral intentions, a decision is made about the moral status of the target group. This decision about moral exclusion or inclusion
determines whether a particular form of behavior towards the target group is perceived as morally appropriate or not. In other words,
moral exclusion creates a link between moral intuitions and intergroup behavior.
The concept of moral exclusion suggests that our moral standards, values, and considerations only apply to those within our moral
community (Opotow, 1990). People do not feel the same moral responsibility towards everyone. Most importantly, they deﬁne the
group of people who belong to their moral community, and therefore they are within their personal scope of justice (Deutsch, 1973;
Opotow, 1990). Members of one’s moral community deserve the treatment based on basic moral principles and rules of justice.
Members of one’s moral community have the right for fair treatment and their entitlement for support is acknowledged and re-
spected. In contrast, the morally excluded can be treated immorally as they are outside the moral community, and therefore they are
excluded from this personal scope of justice (e.g. Deutsch, 1973; Opotow, 1990, 1993, 1995, 2012; Staub, 1989). For this reason,
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moral exclusion can be an essential underpinning of the most severe forms of intergroup discrimination and violence (see Lima-
Nunes, Pereira, & Correia, 2013a; Opotow, 2012; Staub, 1990).
Intergroup threat and psychological distance can be the primary sources of moral exclusion. Outgroup members are actively
excluded from the boundaries of moral concerns when they are perceived as threatening to the well-being of the ingroup. However,
moral exclusion can also be based on the absence of identiﬁcation with the other group. The lack of identiﬁcation with the group is
manifested in indiﬀerence and the assumption that one has no moral obligations towards the members of the distant group (Lima-
Nunes, Pereira, & Correia, 2013b; Olson, Cheung, Conway, Hutchison, & Hafer, 2011; Opotow, 1990, 1993).
In accordance with these two main reasons for moral exclusion, Olson et al. (2011) argue that the concept of moral exclusion
refers to two distinct mechanisms. In the ﬁrst mechanism, moral exclusion refers to the belief that a moral principle of justice does not
apply to the target. It mostly occurs when people fail or refuse to recognize the moral responsibilities towards the target. According to
the second mechanism, moral exclusion also occurs when the target is considered to deserve the negative treatment, or in other
words, moral exclusion and subsequent mistreatment is justiﬁed by the perceived misbehavior of the target. In this case, negative
behavior is based on the moral principle of deservingness.
Consequently, culturally diﬀerent outgroups might be especially at risk of moral exclusion, since their dissimilar cultural back-
ground can be the source of both perceived psychological distance and a sense of threat to the norms and values of the ingroup. For
instance, Coryn and Borshuk (2006) found that moral exclusion of Muslims was often justiﬁed by perceiving Muslims as potential
terrorists and malevolent enemies who threaten American society. Passini and Morselli (2017) found that moral exclusion strongly
correlated with both blatant and subtle prejudice against immigrants, furthermore, respondents with a higher level of general group-
based moral exclusion reported a greater subjective social distance from outgroups in general. According to Lima-Nunes et al.
(2013a), prejudice against immigrants was a strong predictor of moral exclusion, which served as a direct antecedent of dis-
criminative behavioral intentions.
Research question and hypotheses
We have seen that both moral foundations and the moral exclusion of a culturally diﬀerent outgroup inﬂuence intergroup atti-
tudes and intergroup behavior, but we also presume that the inﬂuence of these two characteristics are not independent from each
other. Our hypothesis is that the individual pattern of moral foundations determines the exclusion of culturally diﬀerent outgroup
members from one’s personal scope of justice. We suggest that binding moral foundations constrict the scope of justice to the
members of the ingroup to strengthen its cohesion and intactness. Consequently, people with strong binding moral intuitions do not
feel obliged to take the well-being of outgroup members into consideration. Furthermore, people who decide upon the rightness of an
act based on whether it threatens the cohesion and norms of the ingroup, are more likely to perceive the behavior of a culturally
diﬀerent outgroup members as threatening, and therefore regard the moral exclusion of the outgroup justiﬁed and appropriate.
In contrast, people with strong individualizing moral foundations are expected to be more willing to accept members of a cul-
turally dissimilar outgroup and consider them entitled to morally appropriate treatment. As individualizing moral foundations make
people realize the injustice of prejudice against others purely based on their group-membership, it is also likely that people endorsing
these moral intuitions will recognize the suﬀering caused by prejudice, and therefore feel an increasing sense of moral responsibility
towards them.
We therefore hypothesized that individualizing moral foundations would be positively associated with positive behavioral in-
tentions that aim to promote the well-being of a culturally diﬀerent outgroup, and negatively associated with negative behavioral
intentions that put the outgroup at a disadvantage. In contrast, binding moral foundations were expected to show the opposite
relationships with intergroup behavioral intentions. We also hypothesized that moral exclusion of the target group would mediate the
eﬀect of moral foundations on intergroup behavioral intentions. The importance of revealing this connection is that we can make
more accurate predictions, and therefore design more eﬀective interventions if we understand that people not only behave diﬀerently
toward culturally distant outgroups based on their moral intuitions – because they either focus on the well-being of their ingroup or
show solidarity with people in need – but also because they perceive the intergroup relationship entirely diﬀerently.
The study
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a survey to reveal whether respondents’moral intuitions were related to their willingness to
promote and/or to ﬁght against the interests of Muslim people, and whether the moral exclusion of Muslims mediated this re-
lationship. Since the beginning of the European migrant crisis, the eﬀect of migration from Muslim countries has become a prominent
topic in Hungarian public discourse. Much of this discourse has been about the security, the economic, and the symbolic threat that
Muslim people represents to Europe and to Hungary in particular. Threat was at the center of an anti-immigrant campaign that the
government initiated even before the refugee crisis of 2015, a part of which was a referendum in 2016 about immigration
(Simonovits & Bernáth, 2016). Despite the fact, that Muslim immigration remains a hot topic in public discourse, the country has
practically no Muslim population (it is under 0.1% according to Pew Research Center, 2010), and very little immigration from
Muslim countries. Therefore, most Hungarians have no personal experiences with Muslim people and are not likely to have a strong
sense of psychological connection to this group. In this context, both perceived threat and psychological distance from the group are
important factors in the perception of Muslims in Hungary.
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Participants
Our sample consisted of 490 Hungarian university students from Eötvös Loránd University, who received credits for their par-
ticipation in the study (349 female, Mage=20.82; SDage=2.07).
Measures
Participants completed an online questionnaire measuring individualizing and binding moral foundations, moral exclusion of
Muslims, and diﬀerent positive and negative behavioral intentions towards Muslims. The questionnaire was part of an omnibus
survey; we report all measures for variables related to the research question. Responses were measured on a 7-point scale
(1= strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree) on all items except for the items of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), where
we kept the original 6-point scale (1= not at all relevant; 6= extremely relevant). The scales of the survey were presented in a
randomized order to our respondents. Answers were collected between the 2nd and 17th of March in 2017.
For measuring moral foundations, we used a shortened Hungarian version of the MFQ that was designed to measure in-
dividualizing and binding moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011; the Hungarian adaptation is from Hadarics & Kende, 2017a). Since
the original ﬁve factor structure of the MFQ was not adequate in the Hungarian context, 10 items from the 32 items of the original
questionnaire were kept (Graham et al., 2011). Four items measured individualizing foundations and six items measured binding
foundations. This Hungarian version of the MFQ was identiﬁed as an appropriate tool for measuring these two broader categories of
moral foundations both in terms of psychometric qualities and construct validity (Hadarics & Kende, 2017a).
Moral exclusion was measured by Opotow’s (1993) Scope of Justice/Moral Exclusion Scale. We adapted the items for the target
group of Muslims (see Appendix A). Higher scores on this scale indicated a higher level of moral inclusion, however as our predictions
were phrased about moral exclusion and not inclusion, we reversed the scores of this scale so that higher means indicated higher level
of moral exclusion.
Intergroup behavioral intentions were measured by 10 items created for the purpose of this questionnaire to grasp both positive
and negative, and both individual and collective level behavioral intentions toward the target group. The items were constructed in
line with previous research on collective action and prejudice (e.g. Becker and Wright, 2011). Five items were formulated to assess
positive and ﬁve items to assess negative behavioral intentions. In both cases three items described diﬀerent forms of collective
action, and two items portrayed mere avoidance or helping behaviors without the intentions for social change (see Appendix B). The
choice of measuring both individual and collective behavioral intentions was justiﬁed by the context of Muslim immigration.
When examining the factorial structure of these 10 behavioral intention items, four models were compared to test whether the
two dimensions of the items indeed loaded onto diﬀerent factors. We used the AMOS 23.0 software (Arbuckle, 2014) for this model
comparison procedure, as well as for the structural equation modeling analyses. The ﬁrst model included all items on the same factor,
the second model had the positive and negative behavioral items loading on separate but correlating factors, and the third model had
four separate, but correlating factors (positive collective action, negative collective action, helping behavior, avoiding behavior). The
fourth model was based on the four factors, but these factors built up two correlating second-order factors as well (positive and
negative behaviors). Fit indices of these models are displayed in Table 1 with the second-order factor model showing the most
adequate ﬁt only slightly exceeding the four-factor model.
The four-factor and the second-order factor models were nearly equally appropriate, the ΔΧ2–test that we conducted to test the
diﬀerence between these two models showed no diﬀerences between them (ΔΧ2=0.88; Δdf=1; p= .348). However the four-factor
model showed that the positive collective action factor correlated more strongly with the helping factor (r=0.87; p < .001) than
with either of the negative behavioral factors (negative collective action: r=−0.47; p < .001; avoidance factor: r=−0.53;
p < .001). Similarly, the negative collective action factor correlated more strongly with the avoidance factor (r=0.80; p < .001)
than it showed with the helping factor (r=−0.50; p < .001). The partial correlation between the avoidance and the helping factors
(r=−0.60; p < .001) was also weaker than the partial correlation between the two positive or the two negative behavioral factors.
Taken together, these results indicated that collective action may be a unique form of intergroup behavior, nevertheless, on a more
abstract level it is reasonable to assume that in this study it more generally reﬂected – positive or negative – intergroup behavioral
intentions.
Results
To reveal how individualizing and binding moral foundations predicted positive and negative intergroup behavioral intentions,
Table 1
Model Fit Statistics for the Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis of the Behavioral Intention Items.
Models Χ2 df CFI RMSEA SRMR AIC
One-factor solution 789.64 35 .707 .211 .126 849.64
Two-factor solution 225.88 34 .925 .108 .063 287.88
Four-factor solution 97.26 29 .973 .070 .052 169.26
Second-order two-factor solution 98.14 30 .975 .068 .051 168.10
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and how this prediction changed after moral exclusion was added to the relationship, a two-step structural equation modeling
approach was applied with maximum likelihood estimation. Descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables of the model
are presented in Table 2.
As a ﬁrst step, we built a model with moral foundations as predictors, and the two forms of intergroup behavioral intentions as
outcome variables (Fig. 1). Before the modeling procedure we checked whether missing values were missing at random in our dataset
by running Little’s MCAR test. The result of this test conﬁrmed that they were (Χ2=632.27; df=701; p= .970). Subsequently,
missing values were ﬁlled in by a regression imputation method described by Byrne (2010). In the course of the modeling procedure,
ﬁrst, we calculated mean score-based indices for the four types of behavioral intentions, since our scale reliability analysis showed
appropriate Cronbach-α values for these indices if we used the items measuring the same sort of behavioral intention (and loading on
the same ﬁrst-order factor in the fourth CFA model) together as scales (see Table 2). After that, as our focus was on positive and
negative behavioral intentions, we constructed these variables as latent variables built up from the four indices mentioned above. In
the case of both latent variables, the indicator variables were the indices the items of which constituted the corresponding ﬁrs-order
factors in our fourth CFA-model presented above.
To test the mediating role of moral exclusion, we also constructed a second model in which moral exclusion of Muslims was
incorporated into the model as a mediator between moral foundations and behavioral intentions (Fig. 2). Given that women generally
show higher levels of prosocial attitudes and lower levels of prejudice when answering explicit attitude measures (e.g. Altemeyer,
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables.
Variable Mean SD a 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. Positive collective action 2.88 1.54 .87
2. Helping behavior 3.43 1.61 .77 .72***
3. Negative collective action 2.69 1.38 .70 −.35*** −.36***
4. Avoidance behavior 2.57 1.61 .86 −.46*** −.50*** .64***
5. Moral exclusion 4.30 1.23 .76 −.68*** −.70*** .50*** .60***
6. Indivudualizing foundations 4.71 .75 .75 .30*** .32*** −.14*** −.22*** −.33***
7. Binding foundations 4.35 .67 .71 −.11* −.08 .23*** .16*** .13** .35***
8. Gender – – – −.16*** −.24*** .02 .06 −.17*** −.15*** −.06
Note. ***= p < .001; **= p < .01; *= p < .05.
Fig. 1. Path model showing relationships between moral foundations and intergroup behavioral intentions. Path coeﬃcients are standardized
regression coeﬃcients (***= p < .001).
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1998; Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2003; Milfont & Sibley, 2016; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) the statistical eﬀects of gender on other
variables were controlled in both models. (When coding our respondents’ gender, we used “1” for “female” and “2” for “male”.)
The ﬁrst model showed a good ﬁt (Χ2=16.18; df=7; CFI= 0.991; RMSEA=0.052; SRMR=0.020) and in line with our
expectations, it also showed that individualizing foundations had a negative relationship with negative behavioral intentions
(β=−0.35; B=−0.69; SE=0.096; p < .001) and a positive relationship with the positive ones (β=0.46; B=0.87; SE=0.092;
p < .001), while binding foundations showed a signiﬁcant positive relationship with negative behavior (β=0.33; B=0.72;
SE=0.108; p < .001) and a negative one with positive behavior (β=−0.27; B=−0.58; SE=0.103; p < .001).
Our second mediation model also showed a good ﬁt (Χ2=20.08; df=9; CFI= 0.992; RMSEA=0.050; SRMR=0.019), but
more importantly it also showed that moral exclusion had a signiﬁcant relationship with both forms of moral foundations (in-
dividualizing: β=−0.42; B=−0.69; SE=0.072; p < .001; binding: β=0.28; B=0.51; SE=0.081; p < .001) and intergroup
behavioral intentions (positive: β=−0.77; B=−0.87; SE=0.044; p < .001; negative: β=0.63; B=0.72; SE=0.051;
p < .001).
We also tested whether the eﬀects of moral foundations on behavioral intentions would decrease signiﬁcantly by adding moral
exclusion as a mediator to the model. We did that by ﬁxing these direct eﬀects in the mediation model separately to the values that
had been found in the ﬁrst model for the direct eﬀects of moral foundations on behavioral intentions. After that we compared the ﬁt
of the restricted models to the mediation model without restrictions. We can consider the relevant regression coeﬃcients as diﬀerent
across the two models if the ﬁt of the restricted models is signiﬁcantly worse than the ﬁt of the original mediation model without the
restrictions. By this procedure we found a signiﬁcant drop in the case of the eﬀect of individualizing foundations on positive behavior
(Δβ=0.32; ΔB=0.62; ΔΧ2=70.28; Δdf=1; p < .001) and negative behavior (Δ β=0.26; ΔB=0.52; ΔΧ2=35.44; Δdf=1;
p < .001), as well as in the case of the eﬀect of binding foundations on positive (Δβ=0.21; ΔB=0.45; ΔΧ2=34.84; Δdf=1;
p < .001) and negative behavior (Δβ=0.16; ΔB=0.36; ΔΧ2=15.32; Δdf=1; p < .001) too.
To test whether moral exclusion mediated the eﬀects of the two kinds of moral foundations on intergroup behavioral intentions, a
series of mediational analyses was conducted with the bootstrapping technique suggested by Macho and Ledermann (2011), where
we requested 95% conﬁdence intervals using 2000 resamples. An indirect eﬀect is considered signiﬁcant if the unstandardized 95%
conﬁdence interval around the estimate does not contain 0. According to the results of this mediation analysis, individualizing moral
foundations showed a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect on both positive (β=0.32; B=0.60; p < .001; 95% CI [0.48, 0.75]) and negative
behavioral intentions (β=−0.27; B=−0.50; p < .001; 95% CI [−0.64, −0.38]) mediated by moral exclusion, and binding
foundations did the same (positive behavior: β=−0.21; B=−0.45; p < .001; 95% CI [−0.60, −0.30]; negative behavior:
β=0.18; B=0.37; p < .001; 95% CI [0.25, 0.52]). The indirect eﬀect explained 70.28% of the total eﬀect (β=0.46; B=0.86;
p < 0.001) of individualizing foundations on positive behavioral intentions, and 74.45% of the total eﬀect (β=−0.36; B=−0.67;
p < .001) of individualizing foundations on negative intentions. At the same time, the indirect eﬀect explained 77.74% of the total
Fig. 2. Path model showing relationships between moral foundations, moral exclusion, and intergroup behavioral intentions. Path coeﬃcients are
standardized regression coeﬃcients (***= p < .001).
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eﬀect (β=−0.27; B=−0.57; p < .001) of binding foundations on positive behavioral intentions, and 50.87% of the total eﬀect
(β=0.35; B=0.73; p < .001) of individualizing foundations on negative intentions. The fact that the larger part of the total eﬀects
came from the indirect eﬀects in all cases also point out the important mediating role of moral exclusion in the relationship between
moral foundations and intergroup behavioral intentions.
Discussion
We hypothesized that moral intuitions were related to intergroup behavioral intentions towards culturally diﬀerent outgroups,
speciﬁcally that individualizing moral foundations would promote positive and hinder negative behavioral intentions, while binding
foundations would do the opposite in connection with Muslim people in the Hungarian context. Our results were in line with previous
studies showing that moral foundations had an eﬀect on diﬀerent aspects of intergroup relations, such as intergroup behavior (Kugler
et al., 2014; Nilsson et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2014), intergroup attitudes (Hadarics & Kende, 2017b; Kugler et al., 2014; Low & Wui,
2016; Van de Vyver et al., 2016), perceived threat (Hadarics & Kende, 2017a), or policy preferences (Kertzer et al., 2014). Our
ﬁndings indicated that moral foundations were connected to both prosocial and hostile intergroup behavioral intentions.
In the relationship between moral foundations and behavioral intentions towards a culturally diﬀerent outgroup, the main
function of binding foundations is to connect people in a coherent community based on shared principles about what is right and
what is wrong. Therefore, it is not surprising that those with strong binding morality more easily perceive a culturally diﬀerent
outgroup as opposing the traditional worldview and practices of the ingroup. This perceived opposition can serve as a justiﬁcation for
hostilities and the lack of positive treatment. This assumption is in accordance with studies showing that people with a high level of
cultural conventionality are especially inclined to regard culturally diﬀerent outgroups as a symbolic threat (e.g. Charles-Toussaint &
Crowson, 2010; Crowson, 2009; Kauﬀ, Asbrock, Issmer, Thörner, & Wagner, 2015; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). In contrast,
individualizing foundations make people more willing to judge the rightness of an act taking into account the well-being of others.
Since negative intergroup behavior inevitably causes the suﬀering of others, those with strong individualizing foundations tend to
oppose these behaviors. Furthermore, as these people are more sensitive to the suﬀering of others and injustices committed towards
others, they may be more willing to initiate positive behavior to promote the well-being of the victim-group if they think that the
outgroup’s suﬀering and injustice was caused by the mere group-membership of the victims.
More importantly, we also found that moral exclusion was an important mediator in the relationship between moral foundations
and intergroup behavior. This ﬁnding highlights a potential mechanism explaining how one’s moral preferences transform into
speciﬁc behavioral intentions towards culturally diﬀerent outgroups. On the one hand, intergroup behavior is preceded by the
decision about the moral appropriateness of the particular form of behavior toward the outgroup. This decision is inﬂuenced by
whether the group is considered to be within one’s personal scope of justice. On the other hand, moral foundations at least partly
determine the boundaries of one’s moral community (see also Crimson et al., 2016), and therefore they also have the potential to
determine whether a culturally diﬀerent outgroup is excluded from the boundaries of morality and justice.
Binding foundations predict a restricted scope for at least two reasons. Firstly, as this sort of morality binds people into a cohesive
group, it has the potential to boost moral responsibility towards ingroup members, but it also has the potential to create strict
boundaries between those within the group and those outside this moral community. Secondly, as mentioned before, people with
strong binding moral foundations are more likely to perceive non-conventional outgroups as threatening (Hadarics & Kende, 2017a).
Perceived threat may also justify the moral exclusion of the group, and the subsequent immoral acts toward them.
In connection with individualizing foundations, we found a stronger tendency for the moral exclusion of Muslims, which tendency
mediated the eﬀect of individualizing foundations on behavioral intentions. This ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that in-
dividualizing morality can enhance moral inclusion of a culturally diﬀerent outgroup, because it makes people more conscious about
the well-being of others. However, if the suﬀering of outgroup members is the result of the harsh treatment of the group, it increases
the moral responsibility to work toward the well-being of the group as a whole. In this way, individualizing morality is likely to
support the moral inclusion of entire groups rather than speciﬁc individuals only, and at the same time, motivate prosocial behaviors
while inhibiting hostile ones based on a sense of shared moral community.
Our ﬁnding that both individualizing and binding morality strongly predict moral exclusion supports the adequacy of two main
strategies for promoting positive intergroup relations. A sense of moral responsibility for the fate of others can be promoted either by
including the outgroup into a common ingroup by recategorization (e.g. Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, &
Dovidio, 1989), or by neglecting group-membership and focusing on the individual, as suggested by decategorization and perso-
nalization approaches (e.g. Brewer & Miller, 1984; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Swencionis & Fiske, 2014). We suggest that these two
strategies may have two distinct moral underpinnings in the forms of the two types of moral foundations. In sum, we supplement the
existing literature on moral foundations, moral exclusion, and intergroup behavior by showing that personal moral intuitions are not
simply the direct predictors of intergroup behavior, but they also aﬀect the way people, as members of groups, perceive particular
intergroup situations. This ﬁnding highlights the importance of designing interventions that take into account individual diﬀerences
not only for the sake of emphasizing individually important values, but also because people with diﬀerent moral intuitions deﬁne the
same intergroup situation diﬀerently. Therefore, based on our ﬁndings, we can make more accurate predictions about whether people
will react by helping or hostility to intergroup conﬂicts than on the basis of either moral foundations theory or on the basis of the
theory of moral exclusions.
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Limitations and future directions
Generalizability of our ﬁndings was inﬂuenced by at least two characteristics of the study. Firstly, our student sample did not
make it possible to generalize the revealed relationships to the entire Hungarian society as college and university students have
special characteristics – such as their developmental stage and higher than average educational level and socioeconomic status – that
can potentially inﬂuence their expressed opinions and attitudes (see e.g., Sears, 1986; Wintre, North, & Sugar 2001).
Secondly, our study was conducted in a speciﬁc intergroup context for testing a more general theoretical assumption.
Nevertheless, this speciﬁc intergroup context, Muslims as a target group, and Hungary as the site of data collection seemed suitable
for the study because the topic dominates public discourse, and negative attitudes towards Muslim people have been on the rise since
2015 when the government launched an anti-immigrant campaign (Simonovits & Bernáth, 2016). Furthermore, public perception of
this group blends the most crucial antecedents of moral exclusion, namely psychological distancing and perceived threat. Never-
theless, for higher external validity, the mediating role of moral exclusion should be tested in other intergroup contexts in future
studies.
Our study was correlational, and did not test the causal relationships between the variables. Although we have evidence showing
that moral foundations inﬂuence intergroup attitudes and not the other way around (Van de Vyver et al., 2016), we cannot rule out
the possibility that previous behavior inﬂuence moral intuitions and intergroup attitudes simultaneously. We know from the classical
work on the attitude-behavior relationship that behavior can aﬀect attitudes and not just the other way around (e.g. Bem, 1972;
Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Olson & Stone, 2005; Wells & Petty, 1980), but since we did not ask about previous behavior, we have
no way to control for this eﬀect.
Our results show that moral exclusion is related to both positive and negative intergroup behavioral intentions. Nevertheless, the
mechanisms underlying these two relationships may not be identical, but could be diﬀerentiated according to the two sorts of moral
exclusion described by Olson et al. (2011). Since immoral behaviors causing direct harm to others need justiﬁcations like deserv-
ingness (e.g. Bandura, 1999; Opotow & Weiss, 2000; Ribeaud & Eisner, 2010), it seems likely that negative intergroup behaviors are
driven by the justiﬁed, deservingness-based form of moral exclusion. On the other hand, it is possible that positive intergroup
behavior requiring personal sacriﬁces is driven by the inverse form of the responsibility acknowledgment-based mechanism described
by Olson et al. (2011). The latter would mean the mechanism of moral inclusion, when people are always aware of their moral
responsibility to satisfy others’ entitlement for fair treatment. In the future, it would be important to test these assumptions by
diﬀerentiating more precisely between these two forms of moral exclusion on the level of measurement too.
Conclusion
Intergroup behavior has its moral side, and our study supports the assumption that morality aﬀects the willingness to show either
positive or negative intentions towards a culturally diﬀerent outgroup in at least two ways. Our ﬁndings suggest that personal moral
intuitions determine whether a behavior is right or wrong when it comes to a particular outgroup, but the personal scope of justice
indicates whether we stick to these personal moral standards during an encounter with members of the outgroup. More importantly,
the results presented here indicate that moral intuitions have the capacity to narrow down or broaden the scope of justice (see also
Crimson et al., 2016). This mechanism seems vital in regulating both positive and negative intergroup behavior towards culturally
diﬀerent outgroups.
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Appendix A
Items measuring moral exclusion of Muslims
I believe that considerations of fairness apply to Muslims too.
I am willing to make personal sacriﬁces to help or foster Muslims’ well-being.
I am willing to allocate a share of community resources to Muslims.
Appendix B
Items measuring behavioral intentions towards Muslims
Positive collective action:
I would join an initiatuve (for example by signing a petition) in the interests of Muslim people.
I would join an online campaign against the discrimination of Muslim people
I would join an action (for example a street protest) for the rights of Muslim people.
Helping:
I would supprt an organization helping Muslim people with ﬁnancial donation or otherwise.
I would donate clothes or other household articles, or food to an organization who support Muslim families in need.
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Negative collective action:
I would sign a petition that is intended to protect Hungarian people against the harmful behavior of Muslim people
I would share posts on Facebook or other social media sites that go against the demands and actions of Muslim people.
I would vote for a political party or representative whose intention is to step up against Muslim people.
Avoidance:
I wouldn't like to work together with Muslim people.
I would not send my child to a school that Muslim kids attend.
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